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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The identity of the plaintiff will now be disregarded, and if the central
issue was historically considered a basis for suit at common law within
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, the right to trial by jury will
be granted.30
J. W. MONTGOMERY III
Constitutional Law-SPEEDY TRIAL. Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318,
171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus after being convicted of rob-
bery on a reindictment. 1 His petition alleged a denial of a speedy trial
in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,2
and section eight of the Virginia Constitution,3 and relied upon a Vir-
ginia statute barring prosecution of any person indicted for a felony
who is not brought to trial within a specified period.4 Determining that
the first indictment of the petitioner was defective, the Commonwealth
had secured a second one, thereby delaying the trial seven months from
30. The dissent, written by Justice Stewart, expresses a fear that the majority's logic
will lead to a virtual elimination of all equity jurisdiction, and thereby cause any tradi-
tionally equitable cause of action to be artificially broken down into legal issues. Ross
v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970) (dissenting opinion). The majority of the Court,
however, has not indulged in artificial dissection, but rather has given recognition to the
dual origin of the derivative suit. See note 12 supra. The issue test deals only with
truly legal issues which have been procedurally buried in equitable forms of action due
to the identity of the plaintiff.
1. The reindictment was obtained as a consequence of the trial court holding that a
similar indictment, issued against another suspect for the same crime, charged grand
larceny and not robbery as contended by the Commonwealth. Brooks v. Peyton, 210
Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed... "
3. VA. CONsTr. art 1, § 8:
That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and
nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses,
to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury
of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found
guilty ....
4. VA. CODE ANt. § 19.1-191 (Repl. Vol. 1960):
Every person against whom an indictment is found charging a felony and
held in any court for trial, whether he be in custody or not, shall be forever
discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms
of the circuit or four of the corporation or hustings court in which the case
is pending after he is so held without a trial ....
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the date of the first indictment. During this time, petitioner had made
no demand to implement his right to a speedy trial.
In upholding the conviction and denying the writ, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia stated that relief under the statute implementing
the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial must be demanded prior
to final judgment. Failure to make such timely demand is considered
a waiver of the right.5 In effect, this decision was an endorsement of the
demand-waiver rule utilized to justify convictions after a delay by the
prosecution in bringing the defendant to trial.6
Before 1967, the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution had been held inapplicable to
state criminal proceedings.7 Consequently, the states implemented the
right through state constitutions, statutory enactment, case precedent or
combinations of the three." In 1967, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States expressly extended the right to defendants in state actions
in Klopfer v. North Carolina.9
Klopfer, while declaring the right to a speedy trial to be as funda-
mental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment, failed to
establish specific guidelines.'0 Moreover, examination of the federal
standards reveals that there has been a diverse application of the right."
In most federal jurisdictions, unless the accused demands a speedy trial
5. Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969) citing Rose v. Commonwealth,
189 Va. 771, 774, 55 S..2d 33, 34 (1949).
6. Simply stated, the demand-waiver rule operates to waive the defendant's right to
a speedy trial if he makes no demand prior to or at the trial. E.g, Finnegan v. United
States, 223 F. Supp. 758, 761 (MD. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 323 F.2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1963);
People v. Armes, 37 IMI. 2d 457, 227 N.E.2d 745 (1967). This rule has been applied to
justify delay on the theory that delay in criminal cases is welcomed by defendants
because it usually operates in their favor. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Von Cseh v.
Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963); Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409, 410 (9th
Cir. 1946). But see United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541, 543 (SD. N.Y. 1960)
(rejecting the demand theory).
7. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487 (1908); Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d 513,
515 (7th Cir. 1962); Oberle v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 428, 420 P.2d 251 (1966).
8. See Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions,
77 YALE L.J. 767 n.4 (1968).
9. 386 U.S. 213 (1967). The Supreme Court overruled the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's affrmation of the use of a nolle prosequi with leave over the defendant's
demand for trial. Id. at 222.
10. See 46 N.C. L. REv. 387, 388-90 (1968).
11. See Cohen, Speedy Trial for Convicts: A Reexamination of the Demand Rule,
3 VAL. U. L. REv. 197, 198-201 (1969); Note, supra note 8, at 768-70; 46 N.C. L. REv. at
388-90.
1970]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
before final judgment, he is deemed to have waived that right.12 Such
a requirement appears to be in conflict with other recently asserted
standards protecting the constitutional rights of defendants."3 But these
recent developments have not as yet carried over to the application
of the demand-waiver rule.14 Illustrative of a developing trend in the
federal courts modifying the rigid application of the rule is United
States v. Reed's in which the accused was discharged after a twenty-
six month delay due to government carelessness. Reed held that there
could be no waiver of the right to a speedy trial where the defendant
had no knowledge of the pending charge, or where he was powerless
to assert his right because of imprisonment, ignorance, and lack of legal
advice.' 6
The Virginia constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy trial is
similar to the guarantee expressed in the United States Constitution. 17
Virginia has gone farther, however, as have many other states,'8 by legis-
12. Typically, courts require that a demand for trial, resistance to postponements, or
some effort on the part of the accused be shown to entitle a defendant to a
discharge on the grounds of unreasonable delay. Note, supra note 8, at 768 n.11. For
a discussion of the federal standards as to demand and waiver in light of the recent
extension of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, see Cohen, supra note 11,
at 197-205.
13. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) in which the Court noted "that
before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. Here the
Court was merely applying a rule laid down in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (placing the right against
compelled self-incrimination under the protection of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (imposing
a presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights); accord, Taylor v.
United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
14. See Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cit. 1969); Bynum v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cit. 1968). But see State v. Rhodes, 104 Ariz. 451, 454
P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968). For a case
reflecting both the inroads of constitutional expansion of rights to a speedy trial and
adherence to the demand-waiver doctrine, see State v. McCroskey, 79 N.M. 502, 445
P.2d 105 (1968).
15. 285 F. Supp. 738 (D. D.C. 1968).
16. Id. at 741.
17. See notes 2, 3 supra.
18. E.g., Atiz. R. CRiM. P. 236 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1954); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 178.495 (1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 812 (1951); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-55-1 (1953). These statutes should be compared with the FED. R. CaLM. P. 48(b)
(1968) which authorized dismissal of an indictment for unnecessary delay in bringing
the case to trial.
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latively interpreting the provision. The Virginia Code requires discharge
of persons not brought to trial within a specified time after indictment. 19
A discernible split of opinion has developed over this type of statute,
however, where there has been a dismissal of the original indictment or
information, and a subsequent indictment or information is brought.
One view is that the state may compute the statutory period from the
time of the later indictment.20 This assumes that the second indictment
represents a new and independent proceeding. The opposing and minor-
ity view 21 is that the reindictment statutes, having been enacted by the
legislatures to implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial,
ought to be given a strict construction by the courts to secure this result.
Therefore, the reindictment should have no effect upon the running of
the statute.22
Brooks v. Peyton,23 following Virginia precedent,24 was decided on the
basis of the former theory, that a new indictment constitutes a new
proceeding and reactivates the statute. This interpretation permits in-
definite delay at the discretion of the state and is not dissimilar to the
procedural device of "nolle prosequi with leave" that was struck down
in Klopfer.25 Unless prejudice26 or oppression 27 as a result of the delay
19. See note 4 supra. The enumerated exceptions have been omitted.
20. E.g., People v. Sorrentino, 146 Cal. App. 2d 149, 303 P.2d 859 (1956); State v.
Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 386 P.2d 365 (1963); State v. Moore, 60 Wash. 2d 144,
372 P.2d 536 (1962); State v. Rhodes, 77 N.M. 536, 425 P.2d 47 (1967); Brooks v.
Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
21. E.g., Brown v. State, 85 Ga. 713, 11 S.E. 831 (1890); People v. Hamby, 27 Ill.
2d 493, 190 N.E.2d 289, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 980 (1963); People v. Wilson, 8 N.Y. 2d
391, 208 N.Y.S. 2d 963, 965-66, 171 N.E.2d 310, 312-13 (1960) (dissenting opinion);
State v. Crawford, 83 W.Va. 556, 98 S.E. 615 (1919).
22. See generally note 21 supra.
23. 210 Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
24. Commonwealth v. Adcdck, 49 Va. (8 Grath.) 661 (1851); Mealy v. Com-
monwealth, 193 Va. 216, 68 S.E.2d 507 (1952).
25. Nolle prosequi with leave is a procedural device used to temporarily postpone
prosecution with the consent of the court from which obtained, and reinstate prosecu-
tion at a later date. The facts of the two cases are, however, clearly distinguishable.
For a discussion of the consequences of the use of nolle prosequi, see Klopfer v. United
States, 386 U.S. 213, 216 (1967).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 122 (1966); Taylor v. United
States, 238 F.2d 259, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183,
203 (D. Md. 1955); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891, 893-94 (1955).
27. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967). This opinion does not uphold
the tradition that the right applies only where the defendant can show the delay to have
been prejudicial to his case. Rather it places emphasis on the oppression caused by
the prosecutor's power to delay trial and the anxiety and concern associated with public
accusation. See also United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
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can be demonstrated by the defendant, however, the decision will stand
as a reflection of the currently prevailing application of the demand-
waiver rule.
FRANK F. ARNESS
Juvenile Courts-PROPER QUANTUM OF PROOF IN JUVENILE HEAR-
INGS. In re Sanuel Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
The appellant was found to be a delinquent child' in juvenile court
proceedings, and was placed in a training school. The child's commit-
ment was upheld by the Court of Appeals of New York,2 and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. The appellant
urged that his commitment be reversed on the ground that his right of
due process was violated by the New York statute which allowed a
declaration of delinquency to be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence,3 rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme
Court, in reversing, extended the meaning of due process in juvenile
proceedings involving a violation of criminal law by requiring that the
alleged act be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.4
The juvenile court system as it exists in most states today is regarded
as a vehicle for the rehabilitation of delinquent youths rather than as a
means of punishment.5 The proceedings are of a non-criminal nature,6
and therefore many of those rights which would be guaranteed the
juvenile if he were tried in a criminal court for the same offense have
1. "'Juvenile Delinquent' means a person over seven and less than sixteen years of
age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." N.Y.
JUDICIARY-FAMmY COURT Acr § 712(a) (McKinney 1963).
2. W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N2E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
3. "Any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a respondent
did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." N.Y. JUDICIARY-
FAMmY CoURT Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
4. In re Samuel Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
5. "As originally conceived, the juvenile court was to be a clinic not a court; the
judge and all of the attendants were visualized as white-coated experts there to
supervise, enlighten and cure-not to punish." DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163, 167
(1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See In re Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957);
In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1970).
6. Most state statutes establishing juvenile court systems provide that the proceedings
are to be non-criminal in nature. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.10(3) (1961); GA. CoDE
ANN. § 24-2418 (1959); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.21 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-65
(1953).
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